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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Declaratory Judgments-Requisites for Jurisdiction
of Federal Question Cases-Suit by Alleged Patent Infringer
Under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,' any court of the
United States may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration in a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction. As a condition precedent to the use of this
procedural device, the controversy must be one within the jurisdiction
of the federal court.2  Article III, Section 2 of the United States Con-
stitution declares that this power shall extend to all cases ".... arising
under this Constitution, (or) the laws of the United States ...." Con-
gress has declared that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction
over these "federal question cases." s
The exercise of jurisdiction by the -district courts over "federal
question cases" is controlled by several well settled rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court. First, the federal question must form an essen-
tial and original ingredient in such cases; i.e., it must appear that the
federal right asserted may be defeated by one construction of the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States and sustained by the opposite
construction.4  Second, not only must the federal right be an essential
ingredient of the cause of action, but it must also be set out in the
plaintiff's complaint. 5 The third rule qualifies the second in that the
plaintiff's cause of action itself must present a federal question, unaided
by allegations of anticipatory replies to probable defenses., It will be
noted that these rules restrict the jurisdictional limits of the federal
courts and narrow the opportunities for entrance into them.
In Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,7 M Pipe Line Com-
pany entered into a contract with P, prior to the construction of a nat-
ural gas pipe line, whereby the latter was to negotiate a series of
contracts to secure an adequate reserve of gas. The Natural Gas Act
148 STAr. §955 (1934), 28 U. S. C. §2201 (1948).
'The operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only and does
not attempt to change the essential requisites for the exercise of federal juris-
diction. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946) ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S.
227 (1937); Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U. S. 288 (1935); Southern Pac. Co. v.
McAdoo, 82 F. 2d 121 (9th Cir. 1936).
' 18 STAT. §470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §1331 (1948). For historical discussion
and development of these cases see: Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 46 MicH. L. Rxv. 17 (1947); Chadbourn and Levin, Original Juris-
diction of Federal Question, 90 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 639 (1942) ; Forrester, Federal
Question Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TuI.AE L. Rxv. 263 (1943); Forrester,
The Nature of a Federal Question, 16 Tu.AxE L. Rv. 362 (1942).
' Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824).
'Tenn. v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454 (1894) ; Metcalf v. City of
Watertown, 128 U. S. 586 (1888).
aTaylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74 (1913); Louisville & Nashville R. R. v.
Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 (1908). These rules were reiterated by Mr. Justice
Cardozo in Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U. S. 109 (1936).
'70 Sup. Ct. 876 (1950).
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prohibits the construction of such pipe lines unless a certificate of pub-
lic convenience and necessity has been issued by the Federal Power
Commission, and a prerequisite to the issuance of such a certificate
is an adequate reserve of gas.8 The contracts negotiated by P with
the sellers all contained similar provisions allowing the sellers to termi-
nate their obligations thereunder if such certificate had not been issued
to M Company before a specific date. Notice of issuance of the certifi-
cate was released two days prior to the cancellation date, but the actual
content of the order was not made public until the cancellation date.
The sellers served notice of termination, claiming no certificate had
been "issued" since issuance was conditional upon certain terms of the
order.0 Thereupon M Company and P brought suit against the sellers,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the contracts were still in effect
and binding upon the parties thereto. Jurisdiction was invoked on the
ground that this was a controversy arising under a federal law because
the Natural Gas Act and an order by the Federal Power Commission
had to be constructed and interpreted. The lower court held that it
had jurisdiction and granted the declaratory judgment.10 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether this case was "within
the jurisdiction" of the district court so as to enable it to render the
declaratory relief sought. The Court, with Mr. Justice Frankfurter
writing the majority opinion, held that "not every question of federal
law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the
suit."" Had the plaintiff sought damages or specific performance, he
could have raised no federal question because such a suit would arise
under the state law governing the contract sued upon. Likewise he
could raise no federal question in a declaratory action on the contract
since the contract itself is the basis of the suit, and not some right or
immunity created by a federal law belonging to the plaintiff. Since
there was no diversity and the matter in controversy arose under state
law rather than under the laws of the United States, the Court con-
cluded that the case was not originally within the jurisdiction of the
district court and that court had no authority to render a declaratory
judgment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act was merely an enlargement of the remedies available in the
federal courts; that it could only be used in a case of actutal con-
troversy already within the jurisdiction of the federal court; and that
856 STAT. §83 (1942); 15 U. S. C. §717f (c) (1948).
' The issuance order was conditional upon M Company's obtaining approvals
of operation from the State of Wisconsin, and the communities to be served
therein, of its proposed financing by the S.E.C., and of its rate schedule. 70 Sup.
Ct. 876, 878 (1950).
10 174 F. 2d 89 (10th Cir. 1949). The decision of the district court was not
filed for publication." Quoting from Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 115 (1936).
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jurisdictional requirements were not altered by the Act. He reviewed
the three prerequisites to jurisdiction of "federal question cases" in co-
ercive actions and held that these requirements must also be present
in a complaint which seeks a declaratory judgment.1 2 Thus, the result
seems to be that the plaintiff in "federal question cases," whether seek-
ing a declaratory or coercive judgment, must allege in his complaint as
an essential element of his cause of action a federally protected right,
which belongs to him and which is questioned, as a basis of jurisdiction.
Neither the defendants' answer nor an anticipatory reply, asserted in
the complaint, to a probable defense can aid in tletermining the juris-
dictional question.
This decision dearly does not destroy all "federal question" jurisdic-
tion in declaratory judgment proceedings. A plaintiff may still seek a
declaratory judgment if he asserts in his complaint a federal right which
is questioned and is essential to his cause of action.'3 It is rather in
those cases in which the plaintiff has no such right, but in his complaint
alleges, as a basis of federal jurisdiction, an anticipatory reply to some
probable defense that this decision denies federal jurisdiction.' 4 This
seems a logical result since Congress, in creating this new remedy, stated
that it may be used in those cases uithin the jurisdiction of the district
court.15 The language used by the Court in the principal case to de-
feat jurisdiction is by no means new to declaratory proceedings, as the
lower federal courts have often adopted similar language in such
proceedings.' 6
1 "To sanction suits for declaratory relief as within the jurisdiction of the
district court merely because, as in this case, artful pleading anticipates a defense
based on federal law, would contravene the whole trend of jurisdictional legislation
by Congress, disregard the effective functioning of the federal judicial system and
distort the limited procedural purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act." 70
Sup. Ct. 876, 880 (1950).
11 Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1942) (interstate commerce);
Regents of N. M. College v. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 158 F. 2d 900 (10th
Cir. 1947) (F.C.C.) ; Bradford v. City of Somerset, Ky., 138 F. 2d 308 (6th
Cir. 1943) (right asserted under Civil Rights Act) ; Smith v. Am. Asiatic Under-
writers, Federal, 127 F. 2d 754 (9th Cir. 1942) (China Trade Act) ; Fox v. 34
Hillside Realty Corp., 79 F. Supp. 832 (S. D. N. Y. 1948) (Rent Control Act;
federal question raised, but action dismissed because less than $3000 involved);
Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945) (suit brought by a state);
Sunshine Mining Co. v. Craver, 34 F. Supp. 274 (N. D. Idaho 1940) (F. L. S. A.) ;
Dixon v. Cleveland, 31 F. Supp. 1010 (W. D. S. C. 1940) (National Bankruptcy
Act).
1, One writer has stated that this rule should not apply to declaratory actions.
Note, 44 ILL. L. REv. 827, 831 (1950).14 Diggs v. Pa. Public Utility Comm., 180 F. 2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1950); West
Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 138 F. 2d 320 (9th Cir. 1943); Hary v. United
Elec. Coal Co., 8 F. Supp. 655 (E. D. Ill. 1934); BoRcHARD, DEcLARAoRaY JUDG-
MENTS 233 (2nd ed. 1941).1 Magic Foam Sales Corp. v. Mystic Foam Corp., 167 F. 2d 88 (6th Cir.
1948) ; Wells v. Universal Pictures Co., 166 F. 2d 690 (2nd Cir. 1948) ; Atlantic
Meat Co. v. R.F.C., 166 F. 2d 51 (1st Cir. 1948): State Auto. Ins. Ass'n v.
Parry, 123 F. 2d 243 (8th Cir. 1941); Love v. U. z.. 1081 F. 2d 43 (8th Cir.
1951]
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Probably the greatest effect of this decision, if carried to its logical
conclusion, will be upon declaratory actions commenced by an alleged
infringer to have the defendant's patent declared invalid and not in-
fringed upon by the plaintiff. Generally, in such cases, the defendant
patent holder is disrupting the plaintiff's business by threatening the
plaintiff with a patent infringement suit, and by writing the plaintiff's
customers that the plaintiff is infringing his patent and that if they
continue to deal with him, they will also be guilty of infringement.
Before the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act, the alleged in-
fringer had no remedy in the federal courts, since he could assert no
right or immunity, created by the laws of the United States, belonging
to him.17 But, since the passage of the Act in 1934, the lower federal
courts have consistently held that such declaratory actions "arise under"
the patent laws, and thus are within their jurisdiction, since an essential
ingredient of the plaintiff's cause of action is the nonexistence of a
federal right in the defendant.18 The court of appeals in Edelmann &
Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co.,10 recognizing that the owner of the patent
might sue to enjoin infringement, stated that ". . . now the alleged in-
fringer may sue .... It is of no moment, in the determination of the
character of the relief sought, that the suit is brought by the alleged
infringer instead of by the owner." 20 It is to be noted in these actions
that the defendant's patent must be an essential element of the cause
of action for jurisdiction to prevail; it is not sufficient that it be lurking
in the background.21
1939); McCarth v. Watt, 89 F. Supp. 841 (D. Mass. 1950); Money v. Wallin,
88 F. Supp, 980 (E. D. Pa. 1950); Ambassade Realty Corp. v. Winkler, 83 F.
Supp. 227 (D. Mass. 1949) ; Minneapolis Grain Exchange v. Farmers Union Grain
Terminal Ass'n, 75 F. Supp. 577 (D. Minn. 1947); Meredith v. Carter, 49 F.
Supp. 899 (N. D. Ind. 1943) ; Carlson v. Betmar Hats, 47 F. Supp. 86 (S. D. N. Y.
1942) ; Los Angeles Soap Co. v. Rogan, 14 F. Supp. 112 (S. D. Cal. 1936)."'Am. Wells Works Co. v. Layne Co., 241 U. S. 257 (1916).8 Measurement Corp. v. Ferris Instru. Corp., 159 F. 2d 590 (3rd Cir. 1947);
Grip Nut Co. v. Sharp, 124 F. 2d 814 (7th Cir. 1941); Chicago Metallic Mfg.
Co. v. Edward Katzinger Co., 123 F. 2d 518 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Hook v. Hook &
Ackerman, 89 F. Supp. 238 (W. D. Pa. 1950) ; Tuthill v. Wilsey, 85 F. Supp. 586
(N. D. Ill. 1949); Adorjan Newman Co. v. Richelieu Corp., 81 F. Supp. 763
(S. D. N. Y. 1948); Keyes Fibre Co. v. Chaplin Corp., 76 F. Supp. 981 (D. Me.
1947) ; Petesime Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 43 F. Supp. 446 (S. D.
Ohio 1942); Ice Plan Equip. Co. v. Martocello, 43 F. Supp. 281 (E. D. Pa.
1941); Bakelite Corp. v. Lubri-Zol Development Corp., 34 F. Supp. 142 (D. Del.
1940); Mitchell & Weber v. Williamsbridge Mills, 14 F. Supp. 954 (S. D. N. Y.
1936), 45 YALE L. J. 1287; Lionel Corp. v. De Filippis, 11 F. Supp. 712 (E. D.
N. Y. 1935); Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
1988 F. 2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 680 (1937).
"In only one case did a district court hold that this type case did not arise
under the patent laws. International Harvest Hat Co. v. Caradine Hat Co., 17
F. Supp. 79 (E. D. Mo. 1935). The Edelmaint case declined to follow this
decision.
"Eckert v. Braun, 155 F. 2d 517 (7th Cir. 1946) (patent obtained from plain-
tiff by fraud); Karen Inc. v. Perlitch, 87 F. Supp. 784 (S. D. N. Y. 1949) (con-
tract for royalties under a patent) ; Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co. v. Lanova
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The principal case seems to exclude these declaratory actions by the
alleged infringer from the district court's jurisdiction by stating that
the plaintiff's claim itself must present a federal question unaided by
anything alleged in anticipation of a defense that the defendant may set
up. Certainly an alleged infringer can assert no claim which presents
a federal question. Does this decision thus shut the doors of the fed-
eral courts to such actions and place the alleged infringer again irk the
position he occupied before the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment
Act?
Assuming that it does, what relief would be obtainable in a state
court by the alleged infringer? The district court in Zenie Bros. v.
Miskend22 discussed some of the remedies available. They are: (1)
suit for unfair competition;2 (2) petition to the Attorney General to
bring suit in behalf of the United States to revoke the patent for
fraud ;24 and (3) suit for damages to business caused by a threat to
sue under the patent laws. 25 The court recognized that none of these
remedies are adequate since they do not settle the fundamental rights
of the parties or the validity of the defendant's patent.
One of the primary reasons for restricting the limits of federal
jurisdiction in the ordinary situation is the fact that an adequate remedy
lies in the state courts, and the federal courts -do not wish to interfere
with them. But here, there is no adequate state remedy, and if the
federal courts deny relief, the alleged infringer has no adquate relief
in any court and is powerless to prevent the destruction of his business.
This factor seems sufficient to justify federal courts in retaining juris-
diction of this type suit. Other considerations bolster this conclusion.
The intent of Congress was to create a haven in the federal courts for
all cases which arise under the patent laws.&2 Writers are in accord
that such controversies are within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
2T
Corp., 79 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Del. 1948) (contract in re patent) ; Bettis v. Paterson-
Ballagh Corp., 16 F. Supp. 455 (S. D. Cal. 1936) (contract of assignment of
patent).
22 10 F. Supp. 779, 782 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
2 This is available to plaintiff only if he can prove that the defendant's threats
were made without the intent to follow them up with an infringment suit. Racine
Paper Goods Co. v. Dittgen, 171 Fed. 631 (7th Cir. 1909); Adriance Platt &
Co. v. Nat. Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (2nd Cir. 1903) ; Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed.
46 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1888).
" This it not a remedy of the plaintiff, and he has no way to compel such a
suit. U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224 (1896).
"Am. Wells Works Co. v. Layne Co., 241 U. S. 257 (1916).
"8 It was not the intention of Congress to permit patent owners in patent con-
troversies to avoid the application of the declaratory judgment statute. Bakelite
Corp. v. Lubri-Zol Development Corp., 34 F. Supp. 142 (D. Del. 1940). 36 STAT.
§1092 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §1338 (1948).
',"The defendant has really raised the issue and the plaintiff seeks only formal
adjudication. Any other view would be extraordinary." BORcHARD, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT 809 (2nd ed. 1941). ". . . the Act enables the plaintiff to state -an
1951]
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It may be noted that the Supreme Court in the principal case did not
mention the problem, but it did cite with approval a note on the develop-
ment of declaratory judgments, which, on the very page cited by the
Court, approves of federal jurisdiction of a suit for declaration of non-
infringement and invalidity of defendant's patent.28 The Supreme
Court has had previous opportunities to review these declaratory actions
by the alleged infringer, but has denied suth review.
Although the language of the principal case seems to withdraw from
federal jurisdiction declaratory actions brought by an alleged infringer,
it is suggested that they should retain jurisdiction of such actions. A
suit to have a patent declared invalid is one arising under the patent
laws in substance just as much as the ordinary suit for infringement
since the validity of the patent is the immediate as well as the ultimate
issue in the case.30 The inadequacy of state remedies, and other fac-
tors previously considered, would seem to be sufficient for the federal
courts to' make an exception of these suits, 31 and to retain jurisdiction
over them, although logically they fall within the language of the prin-
cipal case.
WILLIAM E. GREENE.
Domestic Relations-Loss of Consortium from
Injury to Spouse
Plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for loss of consortium
resulting from the negligent injury of her husband. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit in Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co.,' allowed recovery, declining to align itself with unanimous
authority to the contrary in other jurisdictions.
original cause of action which is directly based on the invalidity of the defend-
ant's patent... ." Note, 45 YALE L. J. 1287, 1289. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE
U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 149 (1949). ToumMN, HANDB00K OF PAT rErs 506 (1949).
" Note, Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62
HARV. L. REV. 787, 803 (1949).
"' Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U. S. 560 (1948) (jurisdiction not men-
tioned); Crosley Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 130 F. Zd 474 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 681 (1942); Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty
Co., 88 F. 2d 852.(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 680 (1937) ; Petesime Incubator
Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 43 F. Supp. 446 (S. D. Ohio 1942), aff'd, 135 F. 2d
580, appeal dismissed, 320 U. S. 805 (1943).
'0 Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
"1 A well settled exception to the rule that the plaintiff must assert a federal
right which belongs to him is an action to remove a cloud upon plaintiff's title
where the alleged cloud arises from a federal grant to the defendant. ". . . the
existence and invalidity of the instrument or record sought to be eliminated as a
cloud are essential parts of the plaintiff's cause of action and must be alleged in
the bill." Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486, 490 (1917).
1 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 71 Sup.
Ct. 80 (1950).
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